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A transparent nomination and selection process is the first step towards obtaining qualified 
members of board. It is believed that as the representative (agent) of the owners, members of the board 
must consist of competent and professional people. However, the development of transparent and ideal 
nomination and selection processes in Indonesian State-owned enterprises (SOEs) has been based on 
relatively little research. Considering the relative importance attached by boards to conduct their roles 
in their principal’s interest in a variety of governance tasks in state-owned enterprises, the primary aim 
of this paper is to shed light on the extent to which the nomination and selection process impacts 
performance of the board in implementing good corporate governance in Indonesian SOEs. The 
exploratory nature of this study led to the adoption of a qualitative research methodology which uses 
semi-structured interviews and publically available documents to collect a range of data pertaining to 
board nomination and selection and the work of the boards. Interviews were conducted with four 
informants from three Indonesian SOEs and the Ministry of SOEs. Findings in this study demonstrate 
that unclear job description and expectations exist for board members as a result of unclear functions 
of the board in Indonesian SOEs and exists in a situation where making transparent and accountable 
nomination and selection processes is hard to actuate. This situation is vulnerable to the influences from 
political interests and that even the process itself can degenerate into situations of political interference. 
In the end, it often leads to choosing the wrong person for membership of the board.  This study makes 
a significant contribution to several field: human resource management, corporate governance, and 
Southeast Asia studies by addressing the basic research gaps of board selection process issues in 
Indonesian SOEs. The gap is addressed by providing a more coherent framework for an effective 
nomination and selection system which reflects more clearly the real experiences of those actually 




Studies of corporate governance have been discussed in developed economies since 1980s, however 
the practices of corporate governance did not become widely used in almost all countries in the world 
until after the world economic crisis in 1997-1998 (Barton, Coombes, & Wong, 2004). The global crisis 
in 2007 added further strands to corporate governance development (Lefort & Urzua, 2008). The board 
as governing body was accused being responsible as they breached their fiduciary duties (Cadbury, 
1999; Clarke, 2004). More and more controversy was publicly aired by shareholders, resulting  in 
responses that affected the makeup and operations of boards at the end of 1980s (Kakabadse & 
Kakabadse, 2008).These board issues appeared in the SOEs of many countries (OECD, 2005). The 
problems of passive boards and undue political interference in the work of boards have prompted public 
concern over the governance of SOEs (OECD, 2005). These facts ushered in a new era of pressure for 
change (Leblanc & Gillies, 2005). As a result, the interest in board activities grew in a short period, 
from little or mild, to high or keen interest (Maw & Cooper, 1994). 
Reflecting this increasing interest, the literature and theory about boards in SOEs also developed 
with the emphasis on structural change (Tricker, 2012). There developed a major interest to have better 
boards in SOEs stressing the transparency issues such as the proportion of independent versus inside 
directors, the role of the audit committee, the committee membership (which was mandated to be 
entirely of independent directors), and  the importance of the internal auditor role (Ingley & van der 
Walt, 2004; Kakabadse & Kakabadse, 2001). Despite those studies, the work of many boards in SOEs 
is still not fully effective (OECD, 2005). There are still broad gaps between the knowledge and practice 
of the roles of the boards in SOEs. This broad gap may also mean that the thinking of the roles of the 
GAI International Academic Conferences Proceedings 
New York, USA 
© Copyright by Author(s)  May 22-25, 2016 
133 
boards needs to evolve (Tricker, 2012). Indonesia, with the fourth largest population in the world 
provides a special case for the study of corporate governance because of its huge marketplace. It also 
gives an interesting contrast to corporate governance systems in the developed countries as Indonesian 
has a unique governance system. 
According Hendry and Kiei (2004), boards will not be effective if they are only concerned with 
strategic control (such as superviser management and being accountable) as this role is part of the 
control role (or conformance role). The boards are expected to be involved in strategic thinking such as 
vision or mission-building thus requiring members of the board with competent strategic vision, 
leadership skills and strategic “direction-giving” (Ingley & van der Walt, 2001). To achieve those 
desired requirements, member of the board  must consist of competent and professional people that 
have the necessary skills, experience, knowledge and network to seek the information needed, to 
analyze the information given by the management, and to balance the work of the management (Ingley 
& Walt, 2005 ). If members of the board are professional, it means the board can not only direct the 
management, but can also make valuable contributions to strategy formulation and policy making to 
achieve good governance of the SOEs (duty of care) (Kakabadse, et al., 2010). 
Some scholars who studied the board found the board’s competencies and the process of decision-
making not only depends on the board structure, but also on the qualifications and style of each board 
member. A contribution from each individual member of the board is necessary for effectiveness of the 
board. The nomination and selection process is the first step to obtaining qualified members (Moodie, 
2001). A transparent nomination process will help ensure good quality competitive candidates with high 
profile, good experiences, educated, and the desired characteristics are selected (Tricker, 2012b).  
According to previous studies, a good job design/expectation is important for transparent nomination 
processes. This is because clear job design is able to define who should be nominated and guide 
selection of the right person for the job. If all the tasks, responsibilities, and authorities are well 
identified, then the organization may be able to conduct a transparent and accountable recruitment 
process because clear tasks, responsibilities, and authorities will establish clear measurements and 
requisites for the selection of the candidate. Furthermore, other scholars emphasized that job design is 
a key component in managing boards because it is one major way to translate company goals into the 
specific actions that are required of the board to perform their job (Lepak & Gowan, 2010).  
However, data from OECD (2005) shown that most selection processes in SOEs are not transparent 
and accountable. Thus in practice, most SOE board members in many countries tend to lack substantial 
business perspectives, are of low quality and are often not independent, particularly the ones nominated 
by the state. These state representatives may also be deprived of some of their critical responsibilities, 
to the benefit of shareholding ministers or the management. Their presence may in cases transform SOE 
boards into a political negotiation arena as a transparent nomination process may be hard to conduct 
due to political interference and conflicts of interest in SOEs.  
Despite the importance of clear job design and transparent selection processes, study on selection 
and nomination to board performance in SOEs has been based on relatively little research, particularly 
in Indonesian SOEs. Meanwhile for Indonesian SOEs, the board of commissioners (Indonesia’s term 
for the board) plays an important role as the internal control mechanism in implementing good corporate 
governance. Consequently, it is interesting to have further studies as to whether the selection and 
nomination process has an effect on the board of commisoner’s (BoC’s) effectiveness as measured by 
succession implementing GCG in the SOEs. The purpose of this study is to shed light on the extent of 
nomination and selection process impact performance of the board in implementing good corporate 
governance in Indonesian SOEs. By using qualitative approach through in-depth interview of members 
of the BoC, board of directors, and government officials, the “real” view and perception of the extent 
of the selection and nomination process impacting the performance of the board is revealed and it may 
lead to new interpretations of the process.   
Following this introduction, this paper is presented in four main parts. The first part is a critical 
review of selection and nomination processes. The second part reviews the selection and nomination 
system in Indonesian SOEs. The third describes methodological approach in this study. After that, it 
continues by outlining the findings from the data collected through semi-structured interviews. The 
final section concludes the paper including recommendations for the government.  
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Critical Review: The Board Nomination and Selection Process 
 
There are three situations which require the nomination of the board members (Tricker, 2009a): 
first is the appointment to fill a vacancy arising because of a resignation or death, or when the board 
members are unable to serve, second is the re-appointment on the expiry of the board members, third is 
on the creation of an additional commissionership. Tricker (2009a) and Garrat (2006) are of the view 
that there are criteria regarding individual characteristics for a good board member and the main one is 
integrity. Integrity means being able to distinguish right from wrong and to judge corporate behavior 
accordingly (Tricker, 2009a). As the board members are agents of the company, they must conduct their 
fiduciary duties with integrity, openly and honestly (Garratt, 2006). A person with integrity is trusted 
and trust is essential in the relationship between principal and agent (Fama & Jensen, 1983).  
Other important criteria are intellect, strength of character, and a desirable personality (Leblanc & 
Gillies, 2005).  Intellect is having ‘a good mind’ (Earl, 1983). An intellectual person is the person who 
has an appropriate level of intelligence, able to think at a different level of abstraction and able to see 
situations from different perspectives. Strength of character means that a person is independently 
minded, objective, and impartial (Muller, 2009). Members of the boards are expected to be tough-
minded, tenacious, resilient, have the courage to take a stand, be results-oriented with a balanced 
approach to risks, and to act wisely (Kakabadse & Kakabadse, 2008). A desirable personality means 
that the board members are expected to have flexibility, sensitivity, diplomacy, persuasiveness, the 
ability to motivate and a sense of humor (Garratt, 2006). These kinds of personalities are sufficient in 
the interaction between the chairman and his boardroom peers (Tricker, 2009a).    
Along with choosing board members based on these characteristics, a transparent nomination 
process helps ensure that good quality competitive candidates with the desired characteristics are 
selected (Tricker, 2012b). Edwards (2006) notes that, ideally, a good nomination process has five main 
stages: preparation of the process and vacancy profile, locating suitable candidates, assessing and 
vetting potential candidates, selection and appointment, and an auditing process. She also adds that 
every step has its challenges but the critical steps where the process might be bypassed due to time 
pressures and cronyism are stages three and four. For example, if a minister or other influential decision-
maker has personal, business or political connections with the chosen candidates, stages three and four 
could be perceived as compromised or flawed unless there is acknowledgement of any conflict of 
interest and it is appropriately handled (Edwards, 2006).  
However, a report from OECD (2005) finds that the nomination process of the SOE boards in many 
OECD countries is too rigid and lacks transparency. There are many different ministries and 
government bodies involved and a strong political agenda influences the process (OECD, 2005). This 
kind of situation is frequently found in the countries that use a dual model ownership, where the SOE 
board usually is nominated by ministries and the final decision is in the hands of the prime minister or 
president (OECD, 2005). Some scholars argue that such a nomination process is vulnerable to 
influences from political interest and that even the process itself can degenerate into situations of 
political interference (Chang & Wong, 2004; Okhmatovskiy, 2010; Roe, 2003). The interference could 
be through complex negotiation among the ministries or government bodies or direct nomination of 
political appointees which sometimes involves the parliament or even the president (Okhmatovskiy, 
2010; Watanabe, 2002).  
A study by Rajagopalan and Zhang (2008) found that not just state representative but most of the 
independent members on China SOE boards are political allies or friends or relatives of senior managers 
or owners who may represent the majority shareholder (government). Their findings are supported by 
Lu (2009) who found that the selection of the board members in Chinese SOEs is often determined by 
the Chinese Communist Party rather than through any competitive selection mechanism, including the 
selection of independent board members. As a result, many board chairs and members are directly 
sourced from government officials. In addition, maintaining a good relationship is extremely important 
in the selection process and in the process of accountability in Chinese SOEs (JianYu, 2007). A study 
from Indonesia also indicates that the lack of nomination process reform is one of the reasons why 
independent board members have an insignificant relationship with a company’s performance (Prabowo 
& Simpson, 2011). 
According to the OECD (2005), to avoid abuse of power, cronyism and political bias many 
countries had already started to establish regulations about the selection process for members of boards. 
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In Norway, the government has explicitly excluded the involvement of members of the Parliament, 
Ministries or State Secretaries on the boards of SOEs (OECD, 2005). As well, South Korea started a 
major reform in the nomination process by reducing the number of military or high level bureaucrats 
on the management and boards of SOEs on political grounds and forbidding nomination as a reward for 
career service (OECD, 2005). Even in China in September 2008, there was an agreement between the 
Chinese Communist Party and government that the leaders of Chinese SOEs will no longer come from 
the civil service or the management of the enterprise (Lu, 2009).  
Lu’s (2009) study also found that many developed countries have started to make the process of 
recruitment one of open market competition. Their governments have set up structured nomination 
processes and skill-based nomination systems to ensure that the main selection criteria are competency 
skills (OECD, 2005). The UK has already developed principles including ministerial responsibility, 
merit, independent scrutiny, equal opportunities, probity, openness and transparency and 
proportionality, and a code of practice around the appointment of boards in the public sector (OCPA, 
2005). 
Some countries have also established a nomination committee, particularly for listed SOEs (OECD, 
2005). Such a committee has duties to list requirements and develop further regulation of the nomination 
process. As an independent body, this committee is expected to make the nomination process more 
efficient, transparent and based on merit, and to exclude political activity and affiliation by using 
selection criteria as well as audits (OECD, 2005). Many countries have already built databases for 
qualified candidates as well as relying on the independent recruitment agencies to seek appropriate 
candidates (Lester, Hilman, Zardkoohi, & Cannella, 2008). However, the challenges of the nomination 
process  rely not only on the systems and regulations but also on the lack of timeliness (Kakabadse, et 
al., 2010). Many nomination processes take excessive time because of their complexity and involvement 
of a number of bodies or entities. These challenges have an impact on the continuity and stability of the 
roles of the board (OECD, 2005). 
Objectives 
Based on the gap in knowledge of the boards and by using Indonesian SOEs as the context of the 
study, this research focuses on the extent of a board’s selection process impacting performance of the 
board in implementing good corporate governance (GCG) in Indonesian state-owned enterprises 
(SOEs). It assesses the link between the boards’ selection mechanism and the effectiveness of the BoCs.  
The following research question guided this study:  
 
How effective is the boards’ selection mechanism process’s impact on the work of the Boards of 
Commissioners in Indonesian State-Owned Enterprises? 
 
In addressing this question, two sub-questions are examined: 
 To what extent does the selection process impact on the work of the Boards of Commissioners in 
Indonesian State-Owned Enterprises? 
 To what extent isthe selection process adequate for members of the Boards of Commissioners in 
Indonesian State-Owned Enterprises? 
Selection and Nomination Process in Indonesian SOEs 
The selection and recruitment of members of the BoC in Indonesian SOEs are less regulated than 
selection of BoD members. The arrangements for the selection process of the BoC are stipulated in 
Article 28 of Law No.19 (Undang – Undang BUMN (Indonesian SOEs Law) no. 19, 2003) which states 
that: 
Members of the BoCare appointed on the basis of consideration of integrity, dedication, understanding 
corporate management issues related to one of the management functions, have sufficient knowledge 
in the field of the company, as well as to provide enough time to do their job. (p. 6) 
Furthermore, Article 30 of the law states that “a further provision concerning the requirements and 
procedures for the appointment and dismissal of the BoC is set by the decision of the Minister” (p. 6). 
This means that the government gives full authority to the Minister of SOEs to design the selection 
process and select members of the BoC who have the characteristics (see Article 28 above) necessary 
to do their functions. However, the minister is usually a member of a certain political party. Sometime 
the minister is appointed to represent the interest of a political party. Such authority may give  
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opportunity for the minister to select a person as President Commissioner in strategic SOEs because of 
their alliance (Wicaksono, 2009).   
For listed SOEs, or SOEs that raise and manage public funds, or SOEs with products or services 
used by the public, or SOEs that have a broad impact on the environment, the assessment process of 
prospective members of the BoC is different (Nasution & Setiawan, 2007). The selection is meant to be 
conducted prior to the AGMS by the Nomination and Remuneration Committee and must consider the 
opinions of minority shareholders (Ministry of State-Owned Enterprises, 2006). To do so, the 
Government regulated four stages of the selection process of prospective BoC members (Ministry of 
State-Owned Enterprises, 2006). First, the Ministry of SOEs forms an evaluation team consisting of 
one or several members of the BoC and government officials from the Ministry of SOEs, Finance or 
other ministries. This evaluation team consists of at most five members, including a team leader. The 
evaluation team is chaired by a previous independent commissioner who is appointed by the BoC.   
Second, the evaluation team receives suggestions from the nomination committee or the Ministry 
or previous BoC members or other sources, then the team searches for information about the candidates 
from other sources and establishes a long-list of candidates. This long-list is submitted to the deputy 
Minister of SOEs for approval. Third, after receiving approval, the team conducts a Fit and Proper Test 
(FPT) of the candidates. The fit and proper testing is one process that should be done by the Ministry 
of SOEs for recruitment (selection) of the BoC and the BoD. However, the fit and proper test is not an 
end but merely an instrument (tool) to get prospective directors in accordance with the criteria 
established.  
Fourth, the deputy minister of SOEs, or another deputy minister, conducts the final evaluation 
from the short list in order to determine one candidate for each position of the BoC and the successful 
nominee is recommended to the Minister of SOEs for approval. The Minister of SOEs has to give the 
final result no later than 30 (thirty) calendar days from the date he receives the recommendation of the 
BoC members. This four stage process was established in order to avoid the intervention of other parties, 
be it from political parties or from other power holders, who have vested interests which can lead to 
biased decision-making (Arafat & Fajri, 2009). In the past, SOEs became fertile grounds for the practice 
of ‘looting’ and often served as ‘cash cows’ for the political interests of certain parties. It is necessary 
to prevent the candidate ‘surrogate’ because the candidate surrogate is contrary to the principles of 
GCG, especially the principle of fairness and freedom from conflict of interest (Arafat & Fajri, 2009). 
After the candidates of the BoC are selected, then the process continues to an agreement (called 
Statement of Corporate Intent - SCI) on members of the BoC to be appointed (Ministry of State-Owned 
Enterprises, 2002b). The SCI is one tool that is quite important to improve the transparency of SOEs. 
This tool can be used as a guideline for the management of SOEs, the Ministry of SOEs, and the public 
to promote the establishment of GCG practices in SOEs. This SCI have been prepared by the BoD and 
approved by the BoC. Preparation of the SCI is intended to create a transparent indicator of the 
performances of SOEs in order to ensure optimal performance of SOEs and the effective, efficient, and 
sustainable use of resources. It is also considered to be a commitment of SOEs and their shareholders 
to the performance and accountability forecasts for the next few years. The agreement in the SCI include 
a promise from the BoD, the BoC and all staff that they will try earnestly to advance the company in 
accordance with short and long term plans that have been defined with emphasis on the achievement of 
corporate value (Arafat & Fajri, 2009).  
However although the regulation states that members of the BoC are appointed and dismissed by 
the AGMS through a transparent process, in practice many selection processes are not transparent 
(Rosser, 2003). In many cases, the appointed members of the BoC are only  based on respect, family 
relationships, or other close relationships (referred to as nepotism) (Abeng, 2010). As a result, many 
members of the BoC are former members of BoD from other SOEs, former officers from the Ministry 
of SOEs, Finance or another related ministry, former military Generals, and former ambassadors 
(Kirana & Habriansyah, 2004). Since they are not totally independent, in some SOEs there is a tendency 
for the BoC to influence the directors in carrying out their duties (Abeng, 2001). Meanwhile, for others 
SOEs, the BoD are usually in a strong position, are reluctant to share authority and do not provide 
proper information to the BoC because they lack competence and integrity (Arafat & Fajri, 2009). Thus 
it may necessary to have further research regarding how effective the nomination and selection process 
in Indonesian SOEs is and how it impacts the performance of the BoC. 
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Since this present study is primarily around exploring the perceptions and thoughts of key 
participants to search for the answers to the research questions, a qualitative research methodology was 
used. By engaging with the key actors who were involved with the work of the BoCs which are 
government officials as shareholders’ representative, members of the BoD represent management 
board, and members of the BoC represent the supervisory board, this study explores the extent of the 
selection process and how the selection process impacts the BoC’s performance in Indonesian SOEs. 
Due to nature of the study, it is believed that it is important to gain in-depth understanding from 
the experiences and perspectives of the actors to the extent that they influence the effectiveness of the 
BoC in Indonesian SOEs which had never been done previously. The adoption of a qualitative approach 
may enhance an understanding the real practices of the BoC in Indonesian SOEs. In order to answer the 
research questions, this study was designed to use triangulation method for data collection, including 
conducting semi-structured interviews as well as utilizing documentary analysis from the government, 
international and national agencies, the SOEs, mass-media outputs, and virtual outputs. 
Primary data was collected by semi-structured interviews from a selection of three SOEs, which 
consist of one listed and two non-listed companies. A total of five in-depth semi-structured interviewes 
were conducted for and average one hour from participants in order to allow participants to reveal their 
“real” views and perceptions (List of Participants provided in table 1 below). The data were also 
collected based on the scholars’ perspective in analyzing and explaining the impact of selection 
mechanisms of the process and tying it to the performance of the BoC. They do not statistically represent 









































































Table 1; List of Participants 
(Sources: Prepared by the author) 
A purposive sampling approach was used to draw sample from relevant SOEs.There was also an attempt 
to effect snowball sampling when some participants suggested or introduced other relevant people with 
the same characteristics to participate in our research. Access to participants was ultimately through 
personal contacts. 
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Findings and Analysis 
 
This section starts with presentations and analyses of data from participants regarding their 
perception of the extent to which job design/expectation and the nomination and selection process 
impacts on the work of the BoCs in Indonesian SOEs. As discussed in Chapter 2, the clarity of job 
design may determine transparent and accountable nomination and selection processes (Lepak & 
Gowan, 2010). Without a clear job design/expectation, it is not just difficult to determine the job 
responsibilities and candidate requirements, but it is also very hard to have a transparent selection and 
nomination process (Wright, Dunford, & Snell, 2001).  A transparent nomination and selection process 
is the front line to getting qualified members that may contribute to the board’s effectiveness (Lester et 
al., 2008).  
Findings in this study support this view. Questions regarding the participants’ perceptions of the job 
design for, and expectation of, members of the BoC were raised.  The comments of the President 
Commissioner about his understanding of the job design/expectation for each member of the BoC in 
his SOEs follow.    
In my point of view, the working mechanism in the SOEs is the interaction between agents. As you 
know, a major shareholder in SOEs is the ministry. But, who is the ministry? They are agents of the 
government, not the real owners. And who is the BoD or the BoC, they are also agents. How could this 
thing happen? It is because the SOE does not have a clear owner. Unfortunately, if the interaction on 
the company is only between agents, this company is vulnerable to bad governance. Thus, in order to 
solve this problem, the company needs members of the BoC and the BoD who have special 
characteristics. The intellect, strong character, desirable personality, knowing corporate law and having 
integrity become very important requirements for members of the BoC and the BoD in our SOEs (Gov. 
off-MS-21). 
From this response it seems that he has misunderstood the meaning of the job design. He related the job 
design more to the desired characteristic of members of the BoC rather than to the task, responsibilities, 
and authority. Another interviewee from the government commissioners responded in a similar manner. 
He underlined the qualifications of members of the BoC rather than discussing the process of how the 
SOEs design the jobs for members of the BoC.  
There are three requisites in the selection process; first, members of the BoC have competency in their 
respective business sector; secondly, members of the BoC recognize the mechanism of corporate legal, 
and third they have integrity. While the nomination process members of the BoD has ten terms (Gov. 
Comm-BK-17.)  
From these responses it is seen that those participants do not have a good understanding of the job 
design/expectation of members of the BoCs. Their answers refer more to personal characteristics rather 
than the responsibilities of the position and authority over members of the BoC. According to Lepak 
and Gowan (2010) clarity of the task, responsibilities and roles of the employee are necessary to build 
job descriptions. Thus, it probably indicates that the lack of clarity about BoCs’ responsibilities in 
Indonesian SOEs causes this misunderstanding of participants about job design (see previous section). 
In their study, Lepak and Gowan (2010) also claimed that job design is a key component in managing 
boards because it is one major way to translate company goals into the specific actions that are required 
of BoCs to perform their job. Furthermore, the job design may help to identify the necessary 
competencies, backgrounds, education and experiences that are expected from the candidates in order 
to have a functional BoC (Moodie, 2001). A functional BoC is made up of people who can work 
together and contribute to the ‘positive chemistry’ of the group and arrive at decisions after thoughtful 
discussion; those boards who cannot work this way have been labelled ‘dysfunctional’ (Leblanc & 
Gillies, 2005). Therefore, without clear a job design and clear expectations, many members of the BoCs 
in Indonesian SOEs find it difficult to establish functional BoCs.  
Furthermore, Wright et al. (2001) argue that the job design/expectation is important for the 
organization to be able to nominate and select the right person for the job. If all the tasks, 
responsibilities, and authorities are well identified, then the organization may be able to conduct a 
transparent and accountable recruitment process because clear tasks, responsibilities, and authorities 
establish clear measurements and requisites for the selection of the candidate. The transparent and 
accountable nomination and selection process is important to identify persons who have necessary 
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requirements (OECD, 2004) as well as help to ensure good quality competitive candidates are selected 
(Tricker, 2012).  
Therefore, because Indonesian SOEs do not have a clear description of the job responsibilities or 
expectation for each member of the BoC, it is very hard for the nomination committee to conduct the 
process of nomination and selection based on merit, efficiency, and transparency (see duties and tasks 
of the nomination committee in Appendix C). This study finds that due to unclear job design, the process 
of searching and recruiting the desired candidates is challenging. As a result, candidates are frequently 
selected based on their network, political affiliation, and personal relationships.  One of the participants 
who is President Commissioner expressed this argument:   
The selection and nomination of a BoC depends on the Minister and his sub-ordinates… However, I 
questioned the capabilities of the ministry to find a good and suitable person. If they want members 
of the BoC to become professional, then the selection and nomination process must professional, too 
(Pres. Comm-FI-9.)  
The sentence ‘I questioned the capabilities of the ministry’ has to been highlighted. It is presented 
in this way because it also means that frequently the person selected is not the right person for the job 
as the current nomination and selection process tends to be based on the network approach rather than 
one based on merit and transparency. According to Okhmatovskiy (2010) and Watanabe (2002), the 
network approach in the selection process of the members of the boards impacts on the quality and 
independence of the candidate selected because the network approach is vulnerable to political and 
personal influence.   
A CG expert participant also indicated the same idea. He addressed the implementation of the 
selection and nomination process and said they are different to that which is written in policies (see 
Chapter 3 for details). Frequently, the process of selection and nomination of members of the BoC in 
Indonesia SOEs becomes shortened and ignores the principles of transparency and accountability.     
We should differentiate between the policy and the reality in the nomination or selection of the BoC 
members. As long the roles of the BoC have not been defined clearly, and the BoC have little attention 
from the government and public then it is difficult for the SOEs to have ideal mechanisms in the 
recruitment process of the BoC as it written in the policy. For the government, practitioners, and most 
of the public, the BoCs in Indonesia is the entity that been treated as something that the law required 
incorporated SOEs to have, but in reality very little was known about the real functions of the BoC (CG 
Expert-GC-20). 
He also added that the difficulty of having a transparent nomination and selection processes is not just 
because of unclear job descriptions, but is also because of limited availability of candidates and an 
unattractive remuneration of the BoC.  
Responsibilities of the BoC are written in the government policies. However, it is too general. 
According to my point of view, based on this policy each SOE should determine the job and duties of 
members of the BoC more specifically, so each member of the BoC knows what kind of performance 
they are expected to deliver. Furthermore, it was not so easy to find professional persons with integrity, 
strong character and desirable personality who can be nominated as the BoC members without having 
any knowledge of what they are expected to perform. In Indonesian SOEs, the limited human 
resources and the un-attractive remuneration become reasons for the difficulties in finding qualified 
candidates (CG Expert-GC-20). 
The impression of ‘limited human resources’ here should also be highlighted because candidates 
with the desired qualifications are not always available. An independent commissioner of a bank in 
Indonesia, when interviewed by Prihatiningtias (2012) confirmed that only a few people, particularly 
few women, are qualified and available to be members of the BoCs. However, Ellig and Lang (2008) 
argue that qualified candidates are available; it is a matter of how the company may attract the right 
candidate at the right time with a transparent process and attractive remuneration.      
Furthermore, by cross-checking the position against backgrounds of members of the BoC in 
Indonesian SOEs, it was found that there are BoC members who have experience and education that 
are not aligned with the position they represent. For example, in a particular agro-industrial SOE, there 
was a priest appointed as a member of the BoC. A priest is not going to know anything about the 
agroindustry. He was appointed just because the majority of people at the plantation were Christian. As 
a respected priest, the community will likely listen to and trust him and will not bother the plantation’s 
operations. 
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Studies from previous Indonesian scholars show similar results. They have found that former 
ministers or diplomats, former government civil servants, ambassadors, and academics have been 
appointed as members of the BoCs in Indonesian SOEs and they often do not have any understanding 
of how to direct the enterprise or deal with listed companies (Abeng, 2001; Hardjapamekas, 2000; 
Kamal, 2008a). Most of their appointments are more as a form of reward for their services as public 
servants rather than for their being professionals in the business (Abeng, 2001). Unfortunately, by only 
experience as leaders, but without having appropriate capabilities and understanding about directing a 
business, may not be enough to form a functional BoC in SOEs (Tan & Wang, 2007). 
Furthermore, these former ministers or diplomats, former government civil servants, ambassadors, 
and academics who been selected as members of the BoC frequently have a personal relationship with 
the appointees who are the bureaucrats. As one government commissioner participant comments, 
sometimes the Indonesian government has to appreciate the seniors by giving them ‘prestige’ positions 
(such as members of the BoC in SOEs). In this situation, personal recommendation becomes the most-
important factor rather than independence, transparency, and accountability in selecting members of the 
BoC.  
Placing their people into the BoCs, particularly in strategic Indonesian SOEs might be used by 
political parties, as well as particular groups, to promote their agenda (Habir, 2005). By using their 
allies inside the ministries, these particular parties and groups will ensure that members of the BoC and 
the BoD secure their interest in particular SOEs. With the support of the culture of Indonesian SOEs 
(see the Chapter 3), it is not surprising if abuse of power, cronyism and political bias flourishes in 
nomination and selection of members of the BoCs; particularly in strategic Indonesian SOEs. Under 
such conditions, finding qualified members of the BoC is no longer the enterprise’s objective.  
Meanwhile, without good qualifications, it hard for a person be able to be immediately productive 
in the BoC’s because they need motivation, training, and development to achieve the necessary 
competencies (Moodie, 2001). Nevertheless, despite many disadvantages of the network approach, 
some scholars argue that, due to organizational culture, sometimes recruitment based on the personal 
recommendation may bring stability in the operation of SOEs (Prabowo & Simpson, 2011; Jianyu, 
2008). Thus, it may be necessary to analyze the part played by organizational cultures in the nomination 
and selection process of members of the BoC. 
A summary of findings in this sub-section is shown in Figure 1 which presents the inter-relationship 
between variables with respect to job design, nomination, and the selection process (shown by the full 
line) and between other factors (shown by the dashed line). 
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Figure 1: The relationship between variables related to job design, and the nomination and 
selection process. 
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The implementation of the process for nomination and selection of members of the BoCs in 
Indonesian SOEs has been far from perfect. The process of nomination and selection is still largely 
driven by relationship rather than by professionalism and competency considerations as there have been 
no clear and standard rules about the BoCs’ criteria. Based on the above findings and discussion, this 
study suggests that the process of selection is not getting professional people who have credibility and 
authority to execute the roles of overseeing and directing the SOEs and the current process is inter-
related with other factors. It starts with the choice of the governance structure model that determines 
the roles members of the BoC are expected to play in SOEs. This expectation summarized under the 
job description. In the case of Indonesian SOEs, since there is ambiguity about the roles of the BoC and 
the job description for members of the BoC is not clear. This unclear expectation of members of the 
BoC impacts on the selection and nomination process of the BoC.  The interviewees revealed that to 
gain desirable attributes (including individual characteristics like integrity, intellect, character traits, 
and personality) and competencies (such as knowledge, skill, and experience) it is necessary for the 
SOEs to have a clear understanding about the job of each member of the BoC.  
This study also demonstrates that members of the BoCs in SOEs should be selected and nominated 
through transparent processes as happens in listed SOEs because the government does not always act 
as the main decision body regarding the nomination and selection of members of the BoCs and, more 
particularly, in determining independent commissioners. Political influences are less involved. As a 
result, many of the members become active members, perform better, and contribute more to the SOEs. 
In the SOEs where the nomination of SOEs boards is sometimes complex and there is lack of 
transparency, board members are frequently passive and may maintain the status quo instead being the 
drivers of change processes because they are usually affiliated with political or other interest groups. In 
SOEs where the state is the sole owner and there is an atmosphere of complexity and lack transparency, 
there is greater political influence from bureaucrats or others groups. This political influence is either 
through the nomination process itself, involving complex political negotiations between different 
government organs, or through direct nomination of political appointees. In such situations, the 
members of the BoCs are populated with people chosen for their political allegiance rather than because 
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